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I. Introduction
This article will discuss the subject of worldwide unitary taxa-
tion in its domestic and international aspects. The domestic aspects
will be examined through a description of the different methods by
* J.D., University of Florence School of Law, 1986; M.C.L., The Dickinson School of
Law, 1989.
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which American states impose franchise or privilege taxes on corpo-
rations and through the constitutional issues raised therefrom. The
international aspects will be discussed through risks of double taxa-
tion,1 threats to the international economic relations, and the reac-
tion which followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Container Corporations of America v. Franchise Tax Board.2 The
final part of the article will focus on new legislation adopted by Cali-
fornia in response to the international reactions to the Container
decision.
II. State Apportionment of Corporate Income
Most American states impose annual franchise or privilege
taxes on corporations.$ The most widely used corporate tax measure
is the taxation of net income generated in the taxing state." The de-
termination of the portion of net income of multi-jurisdictional cor-
porations5 to be included in the measure of each state's tax has al-
ways been troublesome and resolved by different approaches.
Specific allocation, separate accounting, and apportionment by
formula are three methods utilized to resolve this determination.
A. Specific Allocation
The specific allocation method traces all property, receipts, and
income of a corporation to the state of their source and attributes
each item to the specific state's tax base.' This method is almost
inapplicable, however, and has been largely rejected by the states.7
The impracticality of this method stems from the difficulty in identi-
fying the source of income derived from multi-jurisdictional
corporations.
1. For the purpose of this article, the taxation of the same corporate income both at the
federal and state level is not considered double taxation.
2. Container Corps. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
3. For a chart of tax treatments by individual states, see Gordon, State Corporate In-
come Taxes - Problems and Solutions, 6 J. OF ST. TAX'N 337, 344-47 (1988) [hereinafter
Gordon]. "The traditional corporate tax was an excise on the privilege of doing business in the
state." J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAX 208-09
(1983) [hereinafter J. HELLERSTEIN].
4. J. HELLERSTEIN AND W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 392 (1978)
[hereinafter STATE AND LOCAL]. Other corporate tax measures are referred to as "capital-
account" bases and "capital-value" bases. Id.
5. Multi-jurisdictional corporations are either domestic corporations engaged in multi-
state or multi-national business through branches and subsidiaries, or foreign corporations hav-
ing domestic branches or subsidiaries.
6. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 328 n.95.
7. Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent Supreme Court Treatment, 48




The separate accounting method assumes that all transactions
between affiliated corporations are carried out as if the companies
are unrelated and dealing at arm's-length. It is very difficult, how-
ever, to determine a fair arm's-length price of the entire volume of
intra-company transactions. Furthermore, the separate accounting
method seems to "completely reject the economic interdependence
and the positive effects that horizontal and vertical integration have
on corporate purchasing, marketing, and selling."'
C. Apportionment by Formula
The apportionment by formula method has been developed to
overcome the problem of allocating the operating income of multi-
jurisdictional enterprises. The apportionment by formula method is
based on mathematical approximation of the income related to the
activities conducted within the taxing state and apportions the profit
to the state. This method rests on the theory that activities in each
state where an enterprise operates contribute to its overall profits,
and on the economic reality that "the whole exceeds the sum of its
parts."9 Unlike earlier formulas which were based on a single factor,
such as property, apportionment by formula has been challenged in
the judicial arena leaving different results.
In Underwood Typewriter v. Chamberlain,° the Supreme Court
upheld the Connecticut method which was based exclusively on the
property factor. "There is nothing in this record to show that the
method of apportionment adopted . . . was inherently arbitrary, or
that its application to this corporation produced an unreasonable re-
sult."'" Contrarily, in Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,12 the
Supreme Court found that "the statutory method, as applied to the
appellant's business . . . operated unreasonably and arbitrarily, in
attributing to North Carolina a percentage of income out of all ap-
propriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in
that State."' 3 Thus, the single property formula has been generally
discarded.
Presently, of the 44 states and the District of Columbia which
8. Id. at 50.
9. Weissman, supra note 7, at 52.
10. Underwood Typewriter v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
11. Id. at 121.
12. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
13. Id. at 135. The Connecticut and North Carolina tax methods were perfectly analo-
gous. The question seems to have been whether the taxpayer had the burden of proving by
"clear and cogent evidence" that the income apportioned to the state was out of all proportion
to the business transaction in the taxing state. Id.
Winter 1989]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tax corporate income,14 the majority utilizes the Massachusetts
formula.15 This formula employs property,1 6 sales, and payroll as its
measuring devices. The three factors are averaged and then multi-
plied to determine the total taxable income. "Property, payroll, and
sales are generally used as apportioning factors because they are
thought to be closely linked with income-producing activity and their
geographic location is relatively easy to identify."' 7
Generally, the apportionment by formula provides a "reasonable
approximation of a multi-jurisdictional corporation's activities in a
particular state."' 8 The underlying concept is the existence of a uni-
tary business. 9 Each state extends this concept to different degrees
of development. As a result, apportionment formulas contain differ-
ent variables depending upon the extension of activities involved. The
formula employed will reflect separate entity base domestic reporting
or worldwide reporting.
1. Separate Entity Base.-If the unitary business theory is ap-
plied on a separate entity base, the state will impose a tax solely on
its apportioned share of all net income derived by the taxpayer cor-
poration from its unitary business. In short, this formula taxes only
those activities which are carried on within the state.20
2. Water's-Edge Accounting and Domestic Combined Report-
ing.-States may also impose a tax on its apportioned share of all
net income derived by the taxpayer corporation and its affiliates en-
gaged in a unitary business. When the state "limits the permissible
scope of the unitary business to the domestic operations of affiliates
incorporated in the United States" it is commonly referred to as us-
ing a water's-edge accounting method. 21 In situations where the uni-
14. Gordon, supra note 3, at 339, 344-45.
15. The Massachusetts formula works as follows:
In-state property + In-state payroll In-state sales Total Income
Total property Total payroll Total sales Corporate - taxable
Income by the
3 state
In this formula, all intercorporate transactions are eliminated. Tannenwald, The Pros and
Cons of Worldwide Unitary Taxation, 25 TAx NOTES 649, 650 (Nov. 12, 1984) [hereinafter
Tannenwald].
16. Generally, only real and tangible personal property are considered because intangi-
ble personal property is allocated to the corporation's state of domicile. Gordon, supra note 3,
at 340.
17. Tannenwald, supra note 15, at 650.
18. Note, The Controversy Over Worldwide Unitary Taxation. Legal, Economical and
Political Implications, 9 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 265, 274 (1985) [hereinafter Note].
19. The formula apportionment is also referred to as the unitary method.
20. Brooks, Speaking With One Voice: A Uniform Glossary For State Taxation of In-
terstate Business, 2 J. OF ST. TAX'N 5, 10 (1983) [hereinafter Brooks].
21. Tannenwald, supra note 15, at 652.
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tary business is intended to include the net income derived from all
the activities of the taxpayer corporation and its domestic affiliates,
wherever conducted, the state is deemed to use domestic combined
reporting.22
3. Worldwide Combined Reporting.-A state may impose a
tax on its apportioned share of all net income derived by the tax-
payer corporation and its worldwide affiliates, even though only part
of the unitary business is carried on within that state's boundaries.
In this situation, the state is referred to as utilizing either domestic
or a total worldwide combined reporting depending upon the treat-
ment of subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations.23 In a unitary
business, total worldwide reporting embraces the foreign parent and
foreign affiliates conducting no trade or business in the United
States.24
III. Definition of Unitary Taxation by the United States Supreme
Court
The different models of formula apportionment, as well as the
different concepts of unitary business, have been repeatedly dis-
cussed and challenged in the judicial arena. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court has both developed the unitary business concept and defined
the constitutional requirements which an apportionment formula
must meet.
A. The Unitary Business Concept
The United States Supreme Court has dubbed the unitary busi-
ness concept as "the linchpin of apportionability."25 Accordingly, a
state may only employ formula apportionment when "all of the in-
come included in the apportionable base is derived from business ac-
tivity unitary with the business carried on in the taxing state."2
Both vertically 27 and horizontally 28 integrated businesses have been
22. Brooks, supra note 20, at 15.
23. Tannenwald, supra note 15, at 653.
24. Granwell, Hirsh, and Milton, Worldwide Unitary Tax: Is It Invalid under Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation?, 18 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 695, 706 (1986).
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
25. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
26. Brooks, supra note 20, at 12. "If a business is not unitary, a separate accounting
method is typically utilized." J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 389.
27. E.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1920). Ver-
tical integration is a "combination of two or more businesses on different levels of operation
such as manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing the same products." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 725-26 (5th ed. 1979).
28. E.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 644, Ill P.2d 334 (1941), affd, 315
U.S. 501 (1942). Horizontal integration "is a combination of two or more businesses of the
same type such as manufacturers of the same type of product." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
725 (5th ed. 1979).
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held to be unitary by the California Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court.
In Butler Brothers v. McColgan,2 9 the Court upheld the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's test for the existence of a unitary business.
The test requires the presence of unity of ownership, unity of opera-
tion, and unity of use.3" Unity of ownership exists when all the busi-
ness activities are conducted either by a single corporation or
through controlled subsidiaries.3 1 Unity of operation is generally rep-
resented by such functions as common legal representation, in-
tercompany financing, and joint efforts in expanding the business.
Unity of use pertains "to executive forces and operational
systems.
' 3
In Edison California Stores Inc. v. McColgan,a3 the California
Supreme Court offered yet another test. "If the operation of the por-
tion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or con-
tributes to the operation of the business without the state, the opera-
tions are unitary."3 4  More recently, in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont,3" the United States Supreme
Court defined the unitary business in terms of functional integration,
centralization of management, and economies of scale.36
Additionally, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board,37 the United States Supreme Court broadened the definition
of a unitary business. The Court held that the prerequisite for the
constitutionally acceptable existence of a unitary business should be
the presence of a "flow of value" between its members.38 The Court
stated that the presence of a substantial flow of goods is not neces-
sary. The qualifying element has become "contributions to income
[of the subsidiaries] result[ing] from functional integration, centrali-
zation of management, and economies of scale."39
29. See 315 U.S. 501.
30. Id.; J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 400; Weissman, supra note 7, at 65 n.99.
31. B. MILLER, THE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 140 (C. McLure ed. 1984)
[hereinafter MILLER].
32. Id. at 141. Generally, intercompany transfer of products, uniform theory of manage-
ment, and interchange of knowledge and expertise fall within the unity of use category.
33. Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
34. Id. at 481, 183 P.2d at 21. This was the pioneer case holding that the "unitary
method was likewise appropriate in the case of apportioning the income of an enterprise con-
ducted through controlled subsidiaries." J. HELLERSTEIN AND W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 4,
at 521.
35. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). For a
description of the case, see Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corpo-
rations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113, 118-40 (1980)
[hereinafter Reflections].
36. Reflections, supra note 35, at 118-40.
37. 463 U.S. at 159.
38. Id. at 178. See also Note, supra note 18, at 281.
39. 445 U.S. at 438. See also, 463 U.S. at 179. The presence of a supervisory role




Unitary taxation has been challenged in the courts principally
on two constitutional grounds: the Due Process Clause'0 and the
Commerce Clause."1 Resulting decisions often provide "alternative
but substantively indistinguishable bases" for disputing the constitu-
tionality of formula apportionments."2
I. The Due Process Clause.-As applied to taxation, due pro-
cess mandates that a state tax must not deprive the taxpayer of its
property without due process of law. This requires that the state ap-
ply the tax only to income earned by the taxpayer within the state's
jurisdiction. In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,3 the United
States Supreme Court determined that a state tax survives Due Pro-
cess Clause scrutiny when there is a definite link such as a minimum
connection, or "nexus" between the state and the person, and the
property or transaction to be taxed."' Moreover, there must be a ra-
tional relationship between the income attributable to the state and
the "intrastate value of the business enterprise. ' ', 5
The parameters of due process constraints regarding the unitary
business principle are partially delineated in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont.' In that case, the Supreme
Court stated that inclusion of foreign source dividend income is pos-
sible under the Due Process Clause when a unitary business is found
to exist and the unitary entity being taxed has a sufficient "nexus"
with the taxing state."
2. The Commerce Clause.-In addition to due process re-
quirements, state taxes on multi-jurisdictional corporations must also
comply with constitutional restrictions imposed by the Commerce
Clause.'8 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,"9 the United
States Supreme Court held that a state tax withstands Commerce
Clause scrutiny when the tax imposed applies solely to activities
technical assistance, and loans made to subsidiaries convinced the Supreme Court that the
state court finding of a unitary business was within the realm of permissible judgment.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Reflections, supra note 35, at 130 n.105.
43. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
44. Id. at 272-73 (referring to minimum connection). See also Note, supra note 18, at
268 (referring to nexus).
45. Note, supra note 18, at 268 n.20.
46. 445 U.S. at 425. In Mobil Oil Corp.'s view, "the Due Process Clause restricted
Vermont's inclusion of foreign dividends in the state's apportionable tax base because a nexus
was lacking." Weissman, supra note 7, at 79.
47. 445 U.S. at 436-42. See also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S.
207, 223 (1980).
48. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 99 for a historical overview of the topic.
49. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Winter 1989]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
which bear a substantial "nexus" with the taxing state. In addition,
the tax must be fairly apportioned and fairly related to the services
provided by the state to the taxpayer,51 and state taxes must not
discriminate against interstate commerce. 2
Subsequently, in Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles,53 the
United States Supreme Court enunciated two additional require-
ments for state taxes which apply to foreign commerce income. The
tax imposed by the state must neither create a substantial risk of
double taxation54 nor prevent the Federal Government from "speak-
ing with one voice" in matters where national uniformity is consid-
ered essential."
IV. The Container Decision
The leading case addressing worldwide unitary taxation is
Container Corps. v. Franchise Tax Board.56 In Container, the Cali-
fornia Franchise Tax Board imposed an additional assessment on
Container Corps. after determining that it had failed to include its
Latin American affiliates in its initial formula apportionment of
income. 7
Container Corps. contended that it and its foreign subsidiaries
did not constitute a unitary business. 8 Container Corps. argued that
formula apportionment, although reasonably precise when applied to
interstate activities, is grossly distorted when applied to a corpora-
tion with foreign subsidiaries, and that formula apportionment im-
plies an equal rate of return from each of the corporations' holdings,
regardless of where they are located. Here, however, Container
Corps.' foreign subsidiaries were significantly more profitable than
its domestic operations.
5 9
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments because they de-
50. Id. at 287. The "substantial nexus" requirement seems to be "a stronger relationship
than the minimum connection which is required by the due process analysis." Note, supra note
18, at 269, n.28.
51. Note, supra note 18, at 269 n.31. See also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,
453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981).
52. 430 U.S. at 279. See also Weissman, supra note 7, at 78.
53. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (as described in J. HEL-
LERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 165).
54. Id. Such double taxation would result in the state placing a discriminatory burden
on multi-national corporations not borne by domestic enterprises. Note, supra note 18, at 269
n.30.
55. 441 U.S. at 453.
56. 463 U.S. at 159.
57. For an extensive description of the case, see J. HELLERSTEIN AND W. HELLERSTEIN,
CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAX S127-S145 (1987 Supplement) [hereinafter
Supplement].
58. 463 U.S. at 163.
59. Id. at 181. Thus, Container Corps. argued that formula apportionment resulted in a
constitutionally impermissible tax on income which bore no rational relationship to its activi-
ties in California. Id.
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pended on data generated through the use of a separate accounting
method to illustrate the unreasonable effect of formula apportion-
ment.60 The Supreme Court refused to require California to switch
from a method that imprecisely measured the income attributable to
any given state to another method that suffered from the same defi-
ciencies."' The Court also noted that states resorted to formula ap-
portionment because of the inadequacy of separate accounting.
Since the California tax was assessed on income earned and
taxed overseas, Container Corps. further argued the additional as-
sessment involved the foreign commerce clause restrictions which
were set forth in Japan Line. 2 The Court conceded that California's
taxing system resulted in actual double taxation, in the sense that
some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations
were also taxes by California based on its share of the unitary busi-
ness.63 The validity of the tax, however, was upheld on the ground
that California would not necessarily reduce double taxation by
adopting the arm's-length approach."
Addressing the principle of federal uniformity in the interna-
tional arena, the Court did not interpret the principle to hold that
"treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical
treatment by the states." 65 Instead, a state violates the uniformity or
"one voice" standard only if it implicates foreign policy issues that
must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal
directive.66 The Court did not find clear federal directives involved in
the present case.
Emphasizing the possibility of retaliation by foreign trade part-
ners, the Court presented three factors that defeated such a conclu-
sion:6 7 (1) Double taxation does not occur automatically in every
case; (2) The tax was imposed upon a domestic, not foreign, corpora-
tion; and (3) The amount of tax is more a function of the state's rate
of taxation rather than its apportionment method.68 The Supreme
Court also held that formula apportionment of a worldwide unitary
business is constitutionally acceptable for calculating the state tax
liability of a domestic parent corporation. 9 Having upheld the con-
stitutionality of California's method of apportionment, the Supreme
60. Id. at 184. The formula apportionment increased by fourteen percent Container
Corps.' income attributable to California. Id.
61. Id. at 181.
62. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
63. 463 U.S. at 187. This double taxation, however, is derived from the differences in
the adopted taxing systems.
64. Id. at 192.
65. Id. at 194 (citing 445 U.S. at 448).
66. 463 U.S. at 194.
67. Id. at 194-95.
68. Id. at 195.
69. Supplement, supra note 57, at S127-28.
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Court's decision represents the apex of worldwide unitary taxation.
Shortly after the Container decision, other states introduced similar
provisions in their statute books."
V. Toward a Solution
The outcome of Container evoked several unfavorable reactions
from the business world7 1 and from major trading partners of the
United States. International response to Container was aimed at les-
sening the penalties imposed on foreign corporations by individual
state's statutes. For example, the British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher alluded to possible retaliation against United States corpo-
rations in a letter to President Ronald Reagan.72 Additionally, the
Japanese Government expressed concern that worldwide unitary tax-
ation would serve as a potential barrier to new Japanese investment
in the United States. 73 Furthermore, the Government of the Nether-
lands in a telegram to Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan ex-
pressed the opinion that even a worldwide unitary apportionment
limited to United States multi-national corporations would be an ob-
stacle to the growth of international economic relations.7 4 Thus, the
ultimate side effect of Container was to urge the federal government
and Congress to act.
A. The Federal Government's Position
To appease multi-national and foreign interests, President Rea-
gan appointed a "[huigh-level [p]anel," known as the Working
Group,75 "to study the unitary tax issue and formulate a compromise
solution . . . acceptable to all parties. 176 The panel's discussion cen-
tered around the twelve states currently using worldwide combined
reporting.7 7 Its final report which was submitted to the President on
70. E.g., Florida adopted worldwide unitary taxation in July, 1983. Weissman, supra
note 7, at 48 n.3.
71. Multi-national corporations engaged in a vigorous campaign against worldwide uni-
tary taxation. Jurinski, California's Water's-Edge Legislation: The Closing Chapter in the
Unitary Tax Debate?, 6 J. OF ST. TAX'N. 23, 25-27 (1987) [hereinafter Jurinski]. See also
Note, supra note 18, at 294 n.179.
72. Weissman, supra note 7, at 48 n.3. Prime Minister Thatcher's "strongly worded"
letter was dated September 6, 1983.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Ferguson, Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The End Appears Near, 4 J. OF ST. TAX'N
241, 242 (1986) [hereinafter Ferguson]. "The Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group
(Working Group) [was] chaired by the then Treasury Secretary Donald Regan." It consisted
of representatives from the business world, the states, and the federal administration. Id. See
also Peters, Reports on Legislation Prohibiting State Taxation on a Worldwide Basis, 27 TAX
NOTES 817, 818-19 (1986) [hereinafter Peters].
76. Note, supra note 18, at 298.
77. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 242. The twelve tates were: Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, and Utah. Id. at 243.
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July 31, 1984, "contained three [p]rinciples of [a]greement78 and
two principal areas of disagreement." 79 The three principles of
agreement were: (1) Water's-edge unitary combination for both U.S.
and foreign-based companies, (2) Increased federal administration
assistance and cooperation with the states to promote full taxpayers'
disclosure and accountability, and (3) Competitive balance for
United States multi-national, foreign multi-national, and domestic
businesses.8" The two areas of disagreement were the treatment of
foreign dividends and the treatment of corporations with 80% of
their activities outside the United States.
The areas of disagreement were left to be resolved at the state
level. According to the final report, if there was not sufficient state
progress by July 31, 1985, federal legislation would be recom-
mended.8' To implement the Working Group's conclusions, the Trea-
sury Department released a draft of proposed legislation."
B. California's 1985 Legislative Session
In the international arena, the United Kingdom passed a bill
that would have empowered Great Britain to retaliate against
United States corporations with subsidiaries in the United Kingdom
and substantial operations in a state which uses worldwide unitary
taxation. 83 The major catalyst of the British legislation was the fail-
ure of California to repeal unitary taxation in its 1985 legislative
session.
The failure emanated from two principal obstacles: the taxation
of a domestic corporation's foreign dividends84 and two foreign pol-
icy issues involving Japan and South Africa. The Japanese issue
dominated the initial stage of the legislative session. California pro-
posed unitary tax relief as a "do ut des8" for relinquishment of Japa-
nese trade barriers against certain California agricultural prod-




81. Id. at 245. Six states-Oregon, Florida, Massachusetts, Idaho, Indiana, and Colo-
rado--soon repealed worldwide unitary taxation. Id.
82. Peters, supra note 75, at 819. The draft was released on July 8, 1985. Id.
83. J. BISCHEL AND R. FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
321 n.12 (1985). The retaliatory legislation would have had the effect of denying credit on
corporate distributions for United Kingdom corporate tax purposes to corporations incorpo-
rated or having their principal place of business in a unitary state. Id.
84. The foreign dividends issue divided foreign and domestic multi-national corporations
into "warring factions". Seward, Worldwide Unitary Taxation - Revolt Begets Reform, 8
Hous. J. OF INT'L L. 247, 273 (1986) [hereinafter Seward].
85. "Do ut des" is Latin for "something in exchange for something else." The widely
used "quid pro quo" more precisely refers to a "misunderstanding." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 442 (5th ed. 1979).
86. Seward, supra note 84, at 273.
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which would have disallowed a multi-national corporation to choose
a water's-edge taxing base, on the condition that the corporation
divest in South Africa. 7
C. President Reagan's Statement
On November 8, 1985, the Federal Government decided to take
a more active position. Since the states had not universally accepted
the Working Group's principles, President Reagan announced that
he would initiate the process of incorporating those principles into an
act of Congress.88 The trading partners of the United States wel-
comed Reagan's position. In fact, "the United Kingdom released a
concurrent statement" delaying action under its retaliatory law until
December 31, 1986.89
Accordingly, the Unitary Tax Repealer Act was introduced in
the United States Senate. 90 The bill prohibits the use of worldwide
unitary taxation in favor of a water's-edge limitation, restricts state
taxation of foreign source dividends, and requires corporations to file
a full disclosure spreadsheet report with the Internal Revenue
Service.91
VI. The California Solution
Following the congressional act, California amended its
franchise tax on corporations on September 5, 198692 to allow quali-
fied taxpayers93 to limit the reach of California's taxing jurisdiction
to those activities occurring within the water's-edge.94 The statute,
however, does not define the water's-edge concept, but simply pro-
vides an exclusive list of the entities allowed to be combined in a
water's-edge group. 95 The statute imposes liability on foreign corpo-
rations doing business within the United States but taxes only those
activities occurring within the United States.9" The statute also re-
quires that "[a] taxpayer which makes a water's-edge election shall
87. Ferguson, supra note 75, at 252.
88. Id. at 254 n.l.
89. Id. at 254-55. See also Peters, supra note 75, at 820.
90. S. 1974, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 17, 975-78 (1985) [hereinafter
UTRA].
91. Peters, supra note 75, at 820-23; Stevenson, California Unitary Reform: A Step
Forward, 6 J. OF ST. TAX'N. 3, 12-13 (1987) [hereinafter Stevenson].
92. 1986 CAL. STAT. 660 § 6.
93. "Qualified taxpayer" is defined in CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110(b)(2) (Deering
1988) [hereinafter CRTC].
94. This was CRTC § 25110(a). Worldwide unitary taxation is still provided for in
CRTC § 25101.
95. Rosati and Knopke, California Unitary Reform Law, 6 J. OF ST. TAX'N 45, 47-51
(1987) [hereinafter Rosati]; Stevenson, supra note 91, at 5.
96. As defined in CRTC § 25110(a)(5). Leegstra, Eager and Stolte, The California
Water's Edge Election, 14 INT'L TAX 101, 103 (1988) [hereinafter Leegstra].
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take into account the income and apportionment factors" 7 of "[a]ny
corporation, regardless of the place where it is incorporated, if the
average of its property, payroll, and sales factors within the United
States is 20 percent or more.""8 The California extension of the
water's-edge accounting method99 is within the parameters of the
"water's-edge unitary combined report method" established by the
Working Group. 00
To be included as a member in a water's-edge group, the
entities must be "affiliated" with the taxpayer' 0 ' and meet the
requirements of California Revenue and Taxation Code
§ 25110(a)(8)(A).'0 2 These stringent requirements often have the
effect of excluding certain non-affiliated entities from a water's-edge
group, thus subjecting them to worldwide unitary taxation.10 3
A. The Election Contract
The water's-edge election consists of a five-year contract be-
tween the taxpayer and the Franchise Tax Board (FTB).'0° Pursuant
to California Revenue and Taxation Code § 25110(d), however, the
FTB has the power to disregard the election at any time if certain
conditions exist. The most peculiar aspect of the water's-edge con-
tract is the payment of an annual election fee.' 5 The fee equals
thirty-thousandths of one percent of the sum of the taxpayer's prop-
erty, payroll, and sales in California. 6 However, "[i]nvestment in
new plants or facilities" '07 and expenditures incurred for new em-
ployees in California'0 8 will reduce the sum of the property, payroll,
and sales used in calculating the election fee. Nonetheless, the sum
to be paid cannot be smaller than ten-thousandths of one percent of
the sum of the taxpayer's current-year California property, payroll,
and sales." 9 Paradoxically, this "minimum", which can exceed the
normal amount calculated on historical factors," 0 may also frustrate
97. CRTC § 251 10(a).
98. CRTC § 2511 0(a)(3).
99. CRTC § 25110(a).
100. Tannenwald, supra note 15, at 819.
101. CRTC § 25110(a) and (b)(l).
102. Income and other factors of the water's-edge members can be taken into account
only if the same income and factor would have been taken into account under worldwide uni-
tary taxation pursuant to § 25101.
103. Leegstra, supra note 96, at 105.
104. CRTC § 251 10(a).
105. CRTC § 25115.
106. CRTC § 25115(b). Property and payroll are determined with respect to the income
year ending in calendar year 1986. Id.
107. CRTC § 25515(c).
108. CRTC § 25115(c). This includes expenditures incurred after January I, 1988.
109. Leegstra, supra note 96, at 119.
110. CRTC § 25115(i). The election fee can be waived only if a taxpayer has no taxable
income either under the water's-edge method or the worldwide method, but even one dollar of
income is enough to trigger the payment of the ten-thousandths of one percent minimum.
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the benefits of increasing investments in California."'
B. Treatment of Foreign Dividends
Under the new California legislation, domestic multi-national
corporations making a water's-edge election will be granted a deduc-
tion for "qualifying dividends""12 received from a corporation not in-
cluded in the unitary group. The qualifying dividends are divided
into two parts. First, taxpayers are entitled to a seventy-five percent
deduction on the first part of dividends."' Second, taxpayers that
have decreased their foreign investment are allowed up to a one hun-
dred percent deduction of the amount of the second part of dividends
attributable to such a decrease. In contrast, taxpayers that have in-
creased their foreign investments have no deductions on the amount
of the second part of dividends attributable to such an increase."'
For these purposes, the measure of the increase or decrease on for-
eign investments is the foreign payroll factor of the taxpayer and its
affiliates." 5
VII. Conclusion
California legislation has quieted disputes about worldwide uni-
tary taxation. Foreign governments, however, are concerned that in
three states-Alaska, North Dakota, and California-worldwide
unitary taxation is still "in the statutes.""' 6 Moreover, although the
Federal Government and multi-national corporations have strongly
supported water's-edge legislation," 7 they are dissatisfied with sev-
eral provisions of the "California Plan."
'" 8
Minor criticisms are stressed in two Technical Correction Bills
which are pending before the California legislature." 9 Other criti-
cisms go further, focusing on the possible unconstitutionality of some
I11. Stevenson, supra note 91, at 12. See supra note 98.
112. Leegstra, supra note 96, at 121.
113. CRTC § 24411.
114. CRTC § 24411 (a). The first part of dividends is equal to the lesser of the amount
of qualifying dividends received in the current year and the highest amount of qualifying divi-
dends received in any of the income years 1984-85-86. The second part of dividends is the
current year qualifying dividends in excess of the first part of dividends. Leegstra, supra note
96, at 127.
115. Id. Both taxpayers that have increased and that have decreased foreign investment
have a seventy-five percent deduction on the eventual remainder of the second part of divi-
dends. Stevenson, supra note 91, at 8-11.
116. CRTC § 24411(c), (d).
117. Weakley, State Unitary Apportionment of Foreign Corporation Worldwide In-
come, 5 B. U. INT'L L. REV. 91, 115 (1987) [hereinafter Weakley].
118. Gray and Forma, The "California Plan": A Retreat to the Water's Edge, 6 J. OF
ST. TAX'N 33, 34 (1987) [hereinafter Gray]. Immediately after the enactment of the Califor-
nia legislation, the Federal Government withdrew its support to some of the UTRA provisions
pending in the United States Congress. Id. See also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
119. Gray, supra note 119, at 34.
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of the adopted solutions, such as the payment of a substantial elec-
tion fee simply in order to be taxed in one "formation" of the unitary
group instead of in another.120 Additionally, the provision of a mini-
mal election fee may lead to discrimination between two taxpayers
having the same income, simply because one of them increases its
current property, payroll, and sales in California."' Similarly, the
foreign dividend deduction provision may also lead to discrimination
between taxpayers; taxpayers are allowed an all-or-nothing deduc-
tion on a portion of qualifying dividends based on the ultimate in-
crease or decrease of their foreign payroll factor. 2
Inevitably these provisions will be challenged in the judicial
arena. The California water's-edge election is effective for income
years beginning on or after January 1, 1988.123 In the coming years,
the courts will have the opportunity to interpret the California solu-
tion. Hopefully, the courts will offer resolutions to the problems
raised by the taxation of foreign and domestic multi-national
corporations.
120. Leegstra, supra note 96, at 161. An example of this legislation is a provision for an
alternative five-year election contract. Id.
121. The Federal Government is also concerned with the magnitude of the election fee,
which could heavily influence the choice of the water's-edge method. Gray, supra note 118, at
35.
122. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
123. CRTC § 25110. Calendar year taxpayers will first be able to make the election on
their returns for the year ending December 31, 1988. Fiscal year taxpayers must wait until the
end of their fiscal year beginning after January 1, 1988.
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